Abstract-Atom is an anonymity system that protects against traffic-analysis attacks and avoids the scalability bottlenecks of traditional mix-net-and DC-net-based anonymity systems. Atom consists of a distributed network of mix servers connected with a carefully structured link topology. Unlike many anonymous communication system with traffic-analysis protection, each Atom server touches only a small a fraction of the total messages routed through the network. As a result, the system's capacity scales near-linearly with the number of servers. At the same time, each Atom user benefits from "best possible" anonymity: each user's anonymity set consists of all honest users in the system, against an active adversary who controls the entire network, a constant fraction of the system's servers, and any number of malicious users. We evaluate Atom on a distributed network of 1,024 dualcore servers and demonstrate that the system can anonymize more than a million Tweet-length messages with less than 30 minutes of latency.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the widespread electronic surveillance of private communications, many Internet users have turned to end-to-end encrypted messaging applications, such as Signal and OTR [2] . These encrypted messaging tools provide an effective way to hide the content of users' communications from a network eavesdropper. These systems do little, however, to protect users' anonymity. In the context of whistleblowing [33] , anonymous microblogging, or anonymous surveys, users want to protect their identities, in addition to the content of their communications.
Unfortunately, anonymity systems that protect against powerful global adversaries typically cannot accomodate large numbers of users. This is primarily due to the fact that tradtional anonymity systems only scale vertically: these systems consists of a handful of infrastructure servers that act collectively as an anonymity provider; the system can only scale by increasing the power of each participating server. Systems based both on classical mix-nets [17] , [43] , [64] and on DC-nets [19] , [68] suffer from this scalability challenge.
The Tor network [26] , on the other hand, is an example of an anonymity system that scales horizontally. The core of the Tor network consists a network of volunteer relays, and increasing the number of these relays increases the capacity of the network overall. This scalability property has enabled Tor to grow to handle hundreds of megabits of traffic per second, for hundreds of thousands to millions of users [3] . However, the fact that Tor provides low-latency anonymity also makes the system vulnerable to a variety of low-cost traffic-analysis attacks that can violate the anonymity of Tor's users [8] , [14] , [27] , [39] , [50] , [66] , [67] .
In this paper, we present Atom, an anonymity system that takes important steps towards marrying the best aspects of these two architectural strategies. Like Tor, Atom scales horizontally: adding more commodity volunteer servers to the Atom network increases the system's overall capacity. Like mix-net-and DC-net-based anonymity systems, Atom provides clear, formal security properties under precise assumptions.
Atom's goal is to provide latency-tolerant unidirectional anonymous communication for short messages. In particular, Atom could be the communication substrate for an "anonymous Twitter" system, an anonymous survey platform, or an anonymous Usenet. Atom is not a Tor replacement: Tor provides low-latency bidirectional communication with no protection against global adversaries. In contrast, Atom aims to provide high-security anonymity for latency-tolerant applications. Atom offers a strong notion of anonymity: an adversary who controls the entire network, a constant fraction of servers, and any number of honest users only has a negligible advantage at guessing which honest user sent which message through Atom.
An Atom deployment ideally consists of hundreds or thousands of volunteer servers, organized into groups. To use the system, each user submits its message, in encrypted form, to a randomly chosen entry group. Once each server group has collected ciphertexts from a large number of users, the group shuffles its batch of ciphertexts (using a mix-net-like construction), and forwards part of each batch to neighboring server groups. After the servers repeat this shuffle-andforward process for a certain number of iterations, our analysis guarantees that no coalition of adversarial servers can learn which user submitted which ciphertext. At this point, each server group decrypts the ciphertexts they hold to reveal the anonymized plaintext messages.
Atom's scalability comes from the fact that each group works locally, and only needs to handle a small fraction of the total messages routed through the network. For the most efficient variant of Atom, the computational and communication overhead of each server grows asÕ(M/N) to route M messages using N servers. In contrast, traditional verifiableshuffle-based and DC-net-based anonymity systems require each server to do Ω(M 2 ) work, irrespective of the number of servers in the system [19] , [43] , [68] .
Designing Atom required surmounting two key technical hurdles. The first was to design a mix-network topology that would protect against all forms of traffic analysis. We do this by applying theoretical results on the mixing times of certain Markov processes, used in the past for analysis of card shuffles [20] - [23] , [35] . We also design a new type of network for distributed mixing that provides lower latency when the message load on the system is high.
The second technical hurdle was to ensure that the system would maintain its security properties against actively malicious servers. To protect against active attacks, we partition servers in Atom into groups in such a way that each group contains (with high probability) at least one honest server. We then rely on the existence of this honest server to ensure that certain invariants hold throughout the system's execution. We instantiate this high-level idea using two different cryptographic techniques. The first relies on classic verifiable shuffle techniques [29] , [34] , [53] , which can proactively identify bad actors but are computationally expensive. The second is a novel "trap"-based scheme, inspired by prior work on robust mixing [41] .
To evaluate Atom, we implemented an Atom prototype in Go, and tested it on a network of 1,024 dual-core Amazon EC2 machines. Our result shows that with 1,024 commodity machines, Atom can support more than one million users sending 160 byte messages with less than 30 minutes of latency.
(Processing this number of messages using the Riposte [19] anonymity system, which depends on centralized infrastructure servers, would take more than 10 hours.) We also demonstrate that Atom scales horizontally: adding more servers in Atom decreases the system's end-to-end latency.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• we propose a new architecture for distributed, horizontally scalable anonymity systems defending against a global network adversary, • we design and implement two defenses to protect this architecture against active attacks by malicious servers, and • we implement an Atom prototype using the proposed architectures and evaluate it on a network of 1,024 commodity machines. With this work, we take a significant step toward bridging the gap between scalable anonymity systems that suffer from traffic-analysis attacks, and centralized anonymity systems that fail to scale.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the Atom architecture, specify our threat model and the goals of Atom, and introduce the cryptographic operations we use.
A. Architecture overview
Communication in Atom is carried out in time epochs, or protocol rounds. At the start of each round, every participating user holds a plaintext message that she wants to send anonymously through the system. At the end of each successful round, at least one honest Atom server holds the plaintext message of each honest user. The Atom servers can then either post these messages to a public bulletin board (to build an anonymous Twitter-like service) or forward these messages to an address specified in the message (to build an anonymous mail system). We assume that the adversary knows the set of Atom users in each round and the set of plaintext messages output by the system -the goal of Atom is to hide which user sent which message in this setting.
Atom provides anonymity by breaking the set of servers into many small groups, and then connecting the groups using a scalable mixing topology. To send a message through the system, each user pads their message up to a fixed length (e.g., 160 bytes for a Twitter-like system), encrypts their message using a cryptosystem that allows reencryption, and submits this ciphertext to a user-chosen group.
Each group collects a certain number of user ciphertexts before processing them. The exact number of ciphertexts each server collects is a policy decision that the system maintainers must make. For example, all groups could agree to wait until each group has collected 1,000 ciphertexts from 1,000 different IP addresses; such a policy will be enforced by the honest server in each group. Each Atom user is anonymous among all honest users in the system, so to ensure that each honest user benefits from a large anonymity set, the groups must collect ciphertexts from many honest users.
Each group in Atom acts as a small-scale reencryption mixnet [55] for mixing its collection of user-submitted ciphertexts. Since users of the system submit their ciphertexts to different groups, each group only mixes a fraction of the total number of ciphertexts in the system at any given time. After all servers in each group has mixed its collection of ciphertexts, the last server in the group divides the batch of mixed ciphertexts into pieces and forwards each piece to a different group, where the subsequent groups are chosen in a way we describe later on. Mix-and-forward procedure continues for a number of iterations and, finally, the groups reveal users' plaintext messages.
To translate this high-level architectural idea into an actual working system, we need to address a number of design questions:
• How do we connect the different groups to ensure that this mix-and-forward procedure actually protects users' anonymity against a global adversary? ( §III) • How can we protect against colluding honest-but-curious servers, who might pool their secrets to try to violate the anonymity properties of the system? ( §IV) • How do we prevent actively malicious servers from deanonymizing users by deviating from the protocol? ( §V)
B. Anytrust groups
Atom partitions the participating servers into groups, with the property that there exists at least one honest server in each group. No one need know which server is honest, as long as all users of the system agree that there exists an honest user in each group. Following prior work, we call these groups anytrust groups [68] . The notion of anytrust groups arises implicitly in many prior anonymity systems. For example, Tor [26] users must be sure that the three relays on their Tor circuit form an anytrust group-if all three servers are malicious, they can trivially deanonymize the Tor user. Similarly, users of a cascade mix-net system [17] must be sure that at least one mix in the cascade is honest.
As in Tor, Atom requires creating a large number of anytrust groups, and the system maintains its security properties if and only if all anytrust groups contain an honest server. The manner in which the system forms these groups is thus of utmost importance to the security of the system overall. In §IV, we describe a number of ways by which the system can divide servers into anytrust groups.
C. Threat model and assumptions
An Atom deployment consists of a distributed network of hundreds or thousands of servers, controlled by different individuals and organizations. A cryptographic public key defines the identity of each server, and we assume that every participant in the system agrees on the set of participating servers. (A fault-tolerant cluster of "directory authorities" could maintain this list, as in the Tor network [26] .) Furthermore, we assume that the servers communicate over encrypted, authenticated, and replay-protected network links, using TLS, for example. A large number of users-on the order of millions-can participate in each run of the Atom protocol.
The servers are organized into many groups, and we assume that each group contains at least one honest server. We do not make any assumptions about the adversarial servers: they can monitor any traffic going through it, and actively tamper with any messages in an attempt to deanonymize users. Adversarial servers can also collude with each other or with adversarial users; for instance, adversarial users can send specially tagged messages in an attempt to deanonymize honest users. We also assume that the adversary has a global view of the network, and that it monitors a significant portion of all traffic on the Internet. 1 Low-latency systems, such as Tor [26] and Aqua [44] , provide little or no anonymity protection in this setting.
We leave availability and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks out of scope. In other words, Atom does not attempt to provide availability or service in the face of an attacker trying to disrupt the network. We do, however, suggest some techniques that could mitigate availability problems in §VI. Moreover, though Atom does not provide availability guarantees, Atom does protect users' anonymity even under DoS.
D. System goals
Atom has three primary goals.
Correctness.
At the end of a successful run of the Atom protocol (i.e., a run that does not abort), each server holds a subset of the plaintext messages sent through the system. We say that the scheme is correct if the union of the message sets held at all honest servers contains the set of messages that the honest users sent through the system. We require correctness to hold if and only if all users and servers execute the protocol correctly-Atom provides no correctness guarantees in the face of faulty or malicious users or servers. This is an important limitation of Atom, which we discuss in §VI.
Anonymity. We say that Atom provides anonymity if an adversary who controls the network, all but one server in each anytrust group, and any number of users, cannot guess which honest user sent which message with probability nonnegligibly better than random guessing. This definition follows that of prior work [13] , [17] , [19] , [43] , [68] , and we formalize our definition in Appendix A.
Scalability.
We say that an anonymity system is scalable if the work per server decreases as the number of servers grows. If there are M messages and N servers in the system, we denote the computation cost at each server as C(M, N). We then we require that lim N→∞ C(M, N) → 0, ignoring low-order terms that depend only on N.
E. Cryptographic primitives
Rerandomizable encryption scheme. Atom makes use of a rerandomizable CPA-secure encryption scheme with a few extra structural properties. We define the full scheme, which is an elementary variation on ElGamal encryption, in Appendix B. Such a scheme consists of the following algorithms, which take a set of public system parameters as an implicit argument:
• (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(). Generate a fresh keypair.
• c ← Enc(pk, m). Encrypt message m using public key pk.
• m ← Dec(sk, c). Decrypt ciphertext c using secret key sk.
• C ′ ← Shuffle(C). Permute and rerandomize a vector C of ciphertexts.
• c ′ = ReEnc(sk, pk, c). Strip a layer of encryption off of ciphertext c using secret key sk and add a layer of encryption using public key pk. If a group of servers is defined by ElGamal-style public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), we define the group public key pk as the product of these public keys: pk = ∏ i pk i . The group secret key corresponding to a group public key is essentially shared amongst all of the members of the group. For this sort of scheme to be secure, all of the public keys must be generated independently of each other (e.g., we cannot have pk 1 = pk −1 2 ). We can use standard discrete log proofs of knowledge [60] to enforce this requirement in the presence of malicious servers.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKs). We make use of three NIZK constructions:
generate a NIZK proof of knowledge of the plaintext corresponding to c.
Compute c ← ReEnc(sk, pk, m) and generate a NIZK proof π that this operation was done correctly. Since we use an ElGamal-like cryptosystem, we can construct the proof efficiently using discrete-log proofs of knowlegde [16] .
• (C ′ , π) ← ShufProof(pk,C,C ′ ). Shuffle the ciphertext set C (using Shuffle) and generate a NIZK π that C is a permuted version of C ′ , reblinded using pk. We use an ElGamal-like cryptosystem, so we can use standard techniques to generate the proof π [9] , [34] , [53] . We occasionally apply these operations to a vector of ciphertexts C, in which case we apply the operation to each component of the vector. Commitment scheme. For our purposes, a cryptographic commitment scheme [10] consists of an algorithm c ← Commit(m) that outputs a "commitment" Comm to a message m. Since the messages in our applications are always sampled from high-entropy distributions, we need not use a randomized commitment scheme.
The security properties we need of a commitment scheme are that it is infeasible to:
• find a pair of messages m = m ′ such that Commit(m) = Commit(m ′ ) (the scheme is binding), and • produce m given only Commit(m) (the scheme is hiding). For our purposes, SHA-256, or another conventional cryptographic hash function, serves as a good commitment scheme.
III. DISTRIBUTED ANONYMITY AGAINST MALICIOUS USERS AND AN EAVESDROPPING NETWORK
We build up to a description of the full Atom system in three steps: we first describe a system that protects anonymity only against an adversary that can view the entire network and control any number of system users. In the next sections, we describe how to protect against honest-but-curious servers using anytrust groups ( §IV). Finally, we show how to make Atom robust against malicious servers ( §V).
A. Mixing with random permutation networks
Atom supports two different network topologies for large scale mixing. The first is based on random permutation networks (Figure 1 ). In this variant, each server is connected to β other servers, where β is a fixed branching factor. This variant works as follows: each user first chooses an Atom server (an "entry server") and encrypts her message with the public key of the server using a rerandomizable encryption scheme. Each user then sends her ciphertext to the entry server. Along with her ciphertext, the user also provides a NIZK to prove she knows the plaintext underlying ciphertext, to prevent a malicious user from submitting a rerandomized copy of an honest user's ciphertext.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that each entry server receives the same number of messages; this could be assured, for example, by having an untrusted load-balancing server that directs users to different entry servers. The load-balancing server does not impact security: the adversary only learns which users participate in an Atom round using which entry server, but does not learn the content of the messages since they are encrypted. Moreover, Atom protects honest users among all honest users, so learning which entry server a user connects to does not impact the anonymity.
Once the Atom entry servers collects many ciphertexts, they then begin a mixing process that repeats for T iterations, where T is a parameter chosen later on. In each iteration of the mixing process, each server performs the following steps:
• Randomly permute the set of user ciphertexts.
• Divide the ciphertexts into β batches of equal size.
• Reencrypt batch i ∈ {1, . . . , β } for the i th neighboring server and forward the reencrypted batch to that server. Each server then receives a number of these ciphertext batches from other servers in the network. The servers then repeat this permute-and-reencrypt process using the incoming batches. After T iterations of mixing, each server in the network holds a set of ciphertexts that has passed through T other servers in the network. The servers can then decrypt these ciphertexts and publish the corresponding plaintexts. Security analysis. At each mixing iteration, each server splits its set of ciphertexts into β batches and forwards one batch each to a set of β servers. If there are N servers and we iterate the mixing process T times, then we can view the network topology as a directed acyclic graph G N,T . The graph consists of T layers of vertices with N vertices in each layer, one vertex per Atom server. An edge from a server s i in layer ℓ to server s j in layer ℓ + 1 indicates that in the ℓth mixing step, server i sends a batch of user ciphertexts to server j. Each server vertex has β outgoing edges. Now, we can use the properties of the graph G N,T to ensure that the iterated mixing produces a near-uniform random permutation of user messages at the output, from the perspective of an eavesdropping adversary. In particular, if we construct the graph G N,T to be a special type of graph, which we call a random permutation network, then this security property will hold. That is, even if the adversary controls all but two of the users and can observe all network traffic, the adversary will have no advantage in guessing which honest user sent which message through the Atom network. The reason is that the servers induce a near-uniform random permutation on the messages, so the probability that the adversary can guess which user sent which message can be no better than random guessing.
Atom is compatible with any network topology that represents a good random permutation network. We leverage prior analyses of random permutation networks to identify two particularly simple candidate topologies.
Permutation Network topologies.
Iterated-butterfly network: Czumaj and Vöcking have shown that O(log M) repetitions of a standard butterfly network (e.g., t = 0 and t = 1 in Figure 1 ) yields an almost-ideal 2 random permutation network on M elements [23] . Since a butterfly network has depth O(log M), the total depth of an iteratedbutterfly random permutation network is O(log 2 M). To use an iterated-butterfly graph to shuffle M messages in Atom, we construct the width-M network and then assign each vertex in the network to a server. Since we have many more messages than servers (N ≪ M), the same server will "be responsible" for multiple vertices in the network. To minimize network communication, we can assign the same server to adjacent vertices where possible. For example, S 1 and S 2 in t = 0 and 1 in Figure 1 could be handled by a single server. The resulting N-server network topology would have O(log 2 N) depth. When using this topology in Atom, the servers would perform T ∈ O(log 2 N) iterations of mixing. Square network: Håstad studied the problem of permuting a square matrix of M elements by repeatedly permuting the rows and columns [35] . His analysis gives rise to a random permutation network on √ M nodes in which each vertex shuffles √ M ciphertexts and connects to √ M vertices on the subsequent layer. Håstad demonstrated that this network produces a nearuniform permutation after only T ∈ O(1) iterations of mixing, while the iterated butterfly requires T ∈ Ω(log 2 M) iterations. Thus, increasing the number of connections in the network dramatically reduces the number of iterations required to yield a good permutation.
Naïve application of this topology to Atom would require each Atom server to handle √ M ciphertexts. If √ M ciphertexts is too many for any one server, we can recursively apply Håstad's construction to produce a random permutation network built from shuffling servers that handle 
B. Mixing with routing networks
The second network topology that Atom supports is based on what we call routing networks. As in a permutation network, each server is connected to β other servers. Each user chooses an Atom entry server and encrypts its message to that server with a rerandomizable encryption scheme, as before. The servers then perform some number T of mixing iterations (we choose T later on). At each mixing iteration t = 1, . . . , T , each server in the network performs the following steps:
Czumaj and Vöcking describe [23] , adding a constant fraction of dummy messages to the system lets us use this network as if it produced a truly random permutation. • Assign each ciphertext independently and uniformly at random to one of β "bins." • Add dummy ciphertexts (encryptions of zeroes) to each bin until each bin contains exactly B t ciphertexts, where the bound B t depend on the mixing iteration t. If some bin contains more than B t ciphertexts, abort the protocol.
(We describe how to choose B t later in the section.) • Randomly permute the ciphertexts in each batch.
• Reencrypt the ith batch (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , β }) for i th neighboring server, and forward the reencrypted batch to that server.
After T steps of mixing, each server decrypts and publishes the ciphertexts it holds. Figure 2 summarizes this protocol. Because each iteration adds dummy ciphertexts to the network, the number of ciphertexts processed by servers increases with each iteration. However, we will soon show that the number of iteration required for a routing network is a small constant.
Security analysis.
As before, we can view the network topology as a layered directed graph with T layers: there is one vertex per server per layer, and there is a directed edge between server s i in layer ℓ and s j in layer ℓ + 1 if server i sends a batch of ciphertexts to server j in mixing iteration ℓ. We say that a layered directed graph is a routing network if taking a directed random walk on the graph, starting at any vertex in the first layer of the graph, ends at each vertex in the last layer of the graph with equal probability.
As long as (1) the network topology is a routing network, and (2) the protocol does not abort in the second step, then every users' message will end up at a uniformly random server independent of the message's starting point, from the perspective of adversarial users and a global eavesdropper. Since the routing choice for each message is random and independent (unlike the case of permutation networks, where the routing decisions for the messages are random but not independent), the final position of adversarial messages do not reveal any information about honest users' messages, and every message can end up at any position due to the nature of the routing network. Moreover, the number of ciphertexts sent between any two servers in a layer is a publicly known value due to dummy messages. Therefore, to a global adversary who controls many users, the position of each honest user's message is uniformly random. Lastly, by choosing the size of each bin (B 1 , . . . , B T ) appropriately, we can also ensure that the probability that the protocol aborts is negligibly small.
Construction from butterfly graphs. We claim that the butterfly network is a routing network: there is a unique path from every input node in a butterfly network to every output node. Thus, taking a random directed walk from any input leads to each output node with equal probability.
To instantiate Atom with an actual routing network topology, we can use the "base-β " butterfly graph on N nodes, where N is the number of Atom servers. This is a butterfly network with N input and output nodes with depth log β N such that a directed random walk from any input arrives at each output node with equal probability. When β = N ε for some constant 0 < ε ≤ 1, this is a graph with constant depth 1/ε.
When instantiating Atom with this topology, each server communicates with β other servers, and the total number of mixing iterations T = log β N in an N-server deployment .
Probability of failure. At each mixing iteration, each server assigns its batch of ciphertexts to bins, and aborts if the number of ciphertexts in any bin exceeds the pre-specified bounds (B 1 , . . . , B T ). How large must each B t be to guarantee that the protocol succeeds with high probability?
Let us begin by analyzing the first mixing iteration (t = 1). Let M t be the total number of messages given to servers in layer t. In the first layer, there are M 1 /N = M/N ciphertexts at every server. The expected number of ciphertexts in each of the β bins is therefore M 1 /(N · β ). Since each server assigns each ciphertext to a bin independently at random, we can use a Chernoff Bound to analyze the probability that the bin load is a δ fraction larger than its expectation: for a fixed constant 0 < δ 1 < 4 and B 1 = (1 + δ 1 )M 1 /(N · β ), the probability that any one bin receives more than B 1 ciphertexts is
For a given number of user ciphertexts M, a given number of servers N, and a given branching factor β , we can select a δ 1 that makes the failure probability p bad arbitrarily small. For example, if M = 2 20 , N = 256, and β = 16, choosing δ 1 = 1 ensures that the probability that a single bin overflows is less than p bad = 2 −80 . We can use similar analysis to compute the bounds B 2 , B 3 , . . . required to make the overflow probability at most p bad for the remaining mixing iterations. Finally, we can take a Union Bound over all bins to bound the probability that there is a failure anywhere in the network:
By choosing the all (B 1 , . . . , B T ) large enough, we can make Pr[Fail] as small as desired.
Efficiency. As the number of servers in a routing network increases, the expected number of ciphertexts in each bin goes to zero. Therefore, a routing network satisfies our scalability requirement. We also show that the overhead of dummy messages decreases proportionally as we have more messages: Figure 3 shows our numerical evaluation of the overhead (the total number of messages processed by the network divided by the number of real messages) in a deployment of 1,024 The ratio of total ciphertexts (including dummy ciphertexts) to message-carrying ciphertexts in a routing network with 1,024 servers, as the branching factor β and number of messages in the system vary.
servers. The number of dummy messages decreases as the expected number of ciphertexts in each bin increases. As the number of messages increases, the wasted work (i.e., number of dummy messages) decreases.
IV. USING ANYTRUST GROUPS TO PROTECT AGAINST HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS SERVERS
The schemes presented so far provide anonymity only if all Atom servers are honest. In practice, however, many of the servers may be adversarial. In this section, we demonstrate that by replacing each server with an anytrust group of servers ( §II-B) we can protect anonymity against honest-but-curious servers (i.e., servers that follow the protocol, but are interested in deanonymizing users). We then show how to defend against fully malicious servers in the next section ( §V).
A. Constructing anytrust groups
An Atom deployment can create the anytrust groups in a variety of ways. In addition, the same server can participate in many anytrust groups in a single Atom deployment.
Random group selection. If we assume that only a constant fraction f of the servers are malicious, a random sampling of k servers will yield an anytrust group with probability 1 − f k . For these groups to be anytrust groups with high probability, it is important that adversarial servers not be able to control which groups they end up in. Otherwise, a small coalition of malicious servers could arrange to control all of the nodes in a single server group.
To ensure a truly random mapping of servers to groups, we can use a public randomness source [12] , [46] to map nodes into anytrust groups. All servers would publish their public keys at time t and then, at time t + 1, the servers would use a public randomness source to map public keys into server groups in an unpredictable and unbiased way.
Policy-based selection. A limitation of using random groups is that they need to be relatively large. For example, if we assume that at most an f fraction of the Atom servers are malicious, and we want the probability of choosing a bad group to be at most 2 −λ , each anytrust group must have k servers such that f k < 2 −λ , or k > −λ / log 2 ( f ). When f = 20% and λ = 80, this amounts to k > 34 servers in each group.
If we have external information about the servers, we can take this information into account when constructing the anytrust groups. For example, some servers might be run by three different organizations that we believe will not collude (e.g., three different trustworthy non-profits in three different countries). In this case, we can construct anytrust groups of size k = 3 by placing one server from each organization.
Prior work has used trust relationships as a basis for choosing relays in Tor circuits [37] , [38] . Our setting is slightly different-a Tor circuit is a user-specific choice, while anytrust group selection in Atom affects all users. Even so, we may still be able to use real-world trust to form anytrust groups in Atom. User-driven selection. An alternative way to select anytrust groups would be based on user trust preferences. For example, say that 15 organizations run large deployments of Atom servers. As long as each user of the system trusts at least one of the 15 organizations, then we can construct anytrust groups of size k = 15, such that one organization controls one server in each group. Even though the Atom users each trust different organizations, this diverse set of users can all use the same system. Using Atom in this way is strictly better, for both performance and anonymity, than having 15 independent anonymity systems, each run by a different organization.
B. Permutation networks with anytrust groups
We now describe how to use anytrust groups to strengthen the permutation network variant of Atom ( §III-A) against honest-but-curious servers. At a high level, we replace every server in the permutation network with an anytrust group of servers, and simulate an honest server using the anytrust group.
To send a message through the system, each user chooses an entry anytrust group and encrypts its message to the entry group's public key (introduced in §II-E) using a rerandomizable encryption scheme. The user then sends this ciphertext to the first server in its anytrust entry group.
We arrange the servers in each anytrust group into an arbitrary but fixed ordering (so there is a first server, second server, and so on). At each mixing iteration, each anytrust group receives a batch of ciphertexts from users or other groups and performs the following operations:
• Shuffle and randomize. Each server in the group shuffles and rerandomizes the set of ciphertexts, then passes the set to the next server in the group. The last server forwards the shuffled ciphertexts back to the first server.
• Divide. The first server divides the ciphertext set into β parts, where β is the same parameter as in §III-A.
• Reencrypt. Each server in the anytrust group strips off a layer of encryption from each batch of ciphertexts and reencrypts the ith batch for the ith neighboring anytrust group using the public key of the ith group.
• Forward. Once every server has reencrypted the batch of ciphertexts, the last server forwards each ciphertext batches i ∈ {1, . . . , β } to the first server in i th neighboring anytrust group. After T mixing iterations, the groups decrypt the ciphertexts to reveal the users' messages in a randomly permuted order. We simulate the independent assignment of ciphertexts to bins (Figure 2 ) using a pad-and-permute scheme.
Security analysis.
Since there is at least one honest server in each group, the adversary (even if it controls all other servers in the group) has no information about which input ciphertext was routed to which subsequent anytrust group. The security of this construction therefore reduces to that of the permutation network scheme with honest servers.
C. Routing networks with anytrust groups
We can also extend the routing network to use anytrust groups by replacing each server with an anytrust group of servers, as in §IV-B. In an anytrust routing network, each anytrust group needs to simulate an honest server (1) routing each input ciphertext into one of β bins independently at random and (2) adding dummy messages.
To simulate this with an anytrust group, we have the first server in the anytrust group add a number of dummy messages to the set of input ciphertexts. (here, we consider the servers to be honest-but-curious, so the first server will correctly add the dummy messages.) If B t is the bin capacity constant of §III-B for the tth mixing iteration, and there are C ciphertexts coming into the anytrust group, then the first server adds (β · B t − C) dummy ciphertexts so that there are β B t ciphertexts total. Then, every server permutes and reencrypts the padded ciphertext set. After this stage, no server knows which ciphertexts contain true messages and which are dummies. The servers then divide this permuted padded set of ciphertexts into β batches of fixed size B t . Finally, the servers reencrypt each batch of ciphertexts (as in §IV-B), and forward each batch to the specified neighboring anytrust group. Figure 4 summarizes this process. Security analysis. Since the servers are honest-but-curious, the first server really does add the correct number of dummy ciphertexts. After these ciphertexts are permuted, by the one honest server in each group, the distribution of ciphertexts into the β batches is exactly the distribution we would get by following the process described in §III-B. In other words, conditioned on the event that no bin/batch contains more than B t ciphertexts, the pad-then-permute process gives rise to exactly the same distribution of ciphertexts as the independent routing described in §III-B. 3 As long there is at least one honest server in the anytrust group, the remaining servers learn no information about which input ciphertext ended up in which outgoing bin. Thus, the anonymity analysis of §IV-B implies that this construction provides security against honest-but-curious servers.
V. FULL ATOM SYSTEM: PROTECTING AGAINST FULLY MALICIOUS SERVERS
In this section, we extend the distributed mixing schemes of §IV to defend against actively malicious servers. Atom supports two different techniques to defend against malicious servers.
The first is based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs): within the anytrust groups every server proves to all other servers in the group that it performed every operation correctly. This technique is the simplest to analyze and allows honest servers to easily identify malicious servers, though it is computationally expensive.
The second is based on trap messages, a technique employed in prior work [41] . In this variant, each user submits two ciphertexts to its entry anytrust group: the first ciphertext encodes the user's message, the second encodes a "trap" message. After the Atom servers have completed the mixing process, they check that all of the trap messages have made it through the system untouched and reveal users' plaintext messages only if so. This technique removes the need for the expensive NIZK proofs, though it increases the bandwidth cost (due to the trap messages) and provides slightly weaker anonymity guarantees, which we describe in detail in §V-B.
A. Detecting faulty servers with NIZKs
To prevent active attacks by the Atom servers, we can make use of verifiable shuffles [9] , [34] , [53] and verifiable decryption [16] . Instead of each server simply shuffling, decrypting, and relaying each batch of ciphertexts, the servers also generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof that they performed these operations correctly. Application of NIZK proofs works the same for both the permutation-network variant ( §III-A) and the routing variant ( §III-B) of Atom, so we describe the necessary modifications in abstract terms.
Once the group collects enough ciphertexts, each server shuffles and rerandomizes them, just as described in §IV-B. After each server performs this mixing operation, the server broadcasts the set of permuted ciphertexts to the other servers in its anytrust group. The server also broadcasts to other servers in its group a NIZK proof that it performed this shuffling operation correctly. If any server detects a failure, it aborts. The servers take turns performing this mix-and-prove step until every server in each anytrust group holds the set of ciphertexts shuffled by the group's last server.
The servers then go in order decrypting a layer of encryption from the ciphertexts, and reencrypting them for the appropriate neighboring anytrust groups, as described in §II-E. The servers use another NIZK proof to convince all other servers in the group that they performed this decryption and reencryption operation correctly. Once the group has confirmed that the last server performed decryption and reencryption operation correctly, each server forwards these output batches of ciphertexts to all of the servers in the neighboring anytrust groups.
Algorithm 1 Atom protocol with NIZKs. Users. To send message m, the user performs the following: 1) Pick an "entry" anytrust group. Let pk be the group public key of that group. 2) Compute (c, π) ← EncProof(pk, m). and send (c, π) to all servers in the group. Servers. Each server in each anytrust group receives a set of ciphertexts C, and executes the following algorithm. 1) Verify: Verify all of the NIZK proofs submitted along with the user-submited ciphertexts. If any of these verification checks fail, abort. 2) Shuffle: Each server s in each group performs the following steps in serial order: a) Server computes (C ′ , π) ← ShufProof(C), and sends (C ′ , π) to all other servers in the group. b) All other servers verify (C ′ , π), and abort the protocol if verification fails. c) If server s is the last server the group, then send C ′ back to Server 1. Otherwise, send C ′ to the next server in the group. 3) Split: Let C ′ be the ciphertexts resulting from the shuffle phase. The first server splits the permuted ciphertext set C ′ into β evenly sized batches, where β is the number of neighboring groups. Call the batches (B ′ 1 , . . . , B ′ β ). The entire process then repeats at the next mixing iteration. At the end of the final iteration of mixing, every server in each each anytrust group decrypts the ciphertexts and can produce a NIZK proof that they performed this decryption correctly. Algorithm 1 details the protocol.
Security argument. First, malicious servers cannot tamper with any input ciphertexts, due to the NIZK that the users generate. For example, a malicious server cannot rerandomize a user's ciphertext and submit it as another user's ciphertext because the server cannot prove it knows the underlying plaintext. Since there is at least one honest server in each of the anytrust groups, the honest server will ensure that either no server tampers with any ciphertext; if a tampering happens, then the proof verification step of the protocol will fail, and the honest server will abort the protocol. When any server aborts before the full protocol completes, the adversary learns nothing about users' messages, because the messages remain encrypted under the honest server's key. Thus, the security of Atom with NIZK reduces to that of honest-but-curious adversary.
B. Atom with trap messages
Generating and verifying the NIZK proofs imposes a substantial computational cost on the servers. Standard NIZK verifiable shuffles, for instance, require each server to perform a number of group exponentiations per element being shuffled. Since every server needs to both produce and verify a number of these NIZK proofs, the extra computation can be burdensome. Our second technique for protecting against active attacks avoids the need for the expensive NIZK proofs. Instead, it uses trap messages to detect misbehaving servers, using an idea inspired by the work of Khazaei et al. [41] .
When using this Atom variant, each user submits a "trap" ciphertext along with the ciphertext encrypting her message. If a server misbehaves, it risks tampering with a trap, since the servers cannot distinguish ciphertexts for trap and non-trap; if a server does tamper with a trap, the protocol will fail.
The trap-based variant of Atom provides a weaker notion of security than the NIZK-based variant: essentially the adversary can remove κ honest users from the anonymity set with probability 2 −κ . (See Game 3 in Appendix A for a more formal treatment.) As long as the number of number of honest users is large, as we expect in a scalable anonymity system, this weaker anonymity property is essentially as good as the traditional anonymity property of Appendix A. For settings in which the stronger anonymity property is necessary, the NIZK variant of Atom can provide it.
This trap variant of Atom makes use of an extra anytrust group of servers, which we call the trustee group. The trustees first collectively generate a per-round public key for the group, in which each trustee holds a share of the corresponding secret key. Users then encrypt their messages using a doubleenveloping technique, proposed previously [32] : each user first encrypt her messages using the trustees' public key with an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme [52] , [56] , and then encrypt the resulting ciphertexts, which we call inner ciphertexts, with the keys of the servers in her entry group.
Each trap message contains the identifier of the entry group, and a random nonce. The user secret-shares the trap with all servers in the entry group to prevent any malicious servers from tampering with the traps. Unlike the inner ciphertexts, the traps are not double-enveloped, and are only encrypted under the public key of the entry group.
Each user then submits two ciphertexts, one containing the real message and one containing the trap to the entry group in a random order. The ciphertexts are then mixed using the mixing protocol presented in §IV, without any NIZKs. (The trap and message ciphertexts are considered independent ciphertexts for shuffling.) The resulting messages at the end of the network consist of a set of inner ciphertexts and traps. Since each trap contains a group identifier and a nonce, this trap can be sent back to the entry group and the servers can check validity of the traps using their secret shares. Each anytrust group then reports to the trustees the number of valid traps it received.
If the number of traps is not equal to the number of inner ciphertexts, then at least one of the servers misbehaved so the trustees destroy their secret decryption keys to prevent anyone from learning the plaintext messages sent by the users. In addition, the servers explicitly check for duplicate inner ciphertexts. If any duplicates appear, the servers advise the trustees, who again destroy their decryption keys. Figure 5 shows the network architecture with the trap messages. Algorithm 2 details the mixing protocol with trap messages for users and servers. Security analysis. We first argue that the adversaries cannot tamper with trap messages without being detected. We then argue that, with high probability, an adversary cannot deanonymize any particular user.
We sketch our argument for why the construction provides the desired security properties. The servers can tamper with a trap message by (1) dropping the trap, (2) duplicating an existing trap, or (3) replacing an existing trap with a new trap. The first will be detected by the one honest server because the expected number of traps is public: the number of traps presented to the server should be exactly the number of users who submitted a message to that group. The second attack will be detected because the group will either receive both of the duplicates or it will receive an incorrect number of traps. Finally, because the user shares the commitments for all shares of the trap with all of the anytrust group, the adversary cannot generate another trap that matches the commitments. Thus, the adversary cannot tamper with any trap messages.
Similarly, for the inner ciphertexts, the only way an adversary can tamper with an honest user's ciphertext is to duplicate it or replace it completely, due to the fact that IND-CCA2 ciphertexts are non-malleable. The honest servers check for duplicate inner ciphertexts, and abort the protocol if they find duplicates, so duplicating a ciphertext cannot help the adversary.
Algorithm 2 Atom protocol with trap messages.
Users. To send message m, the user performs the following: 1) Encrypts m using the trustees' public key pk T : c T ← Enc(pk T , m). 2) Pick an entry anytrust group. Let gid be the index of the entry anytrust group. Choose a random nonce and generate a message-length "trap string" as trap ← "gid nonce". (where pk i is the public key of the ith neighboring group), where sk s is the secret key of the current server. Else, compute (C ′′ , π ′ ) = Dec(sk s ,C ′ ). b) If Server s is the last server of a group and this is not the last mixing iteration, then send each B ′ i to all servers in the i th neighboring group. Otherwise, forward (B ′ 1 , . . . , B ′ β ) or C ′′ to the next server in this group. After the last mixing iteration completes, servers forward the trap messages to the anytrust group indicated in the trap message header. The servers next run a distributed check to ensure that there are no duplicate inner ciphertexts. The servers accomplish this in a distributed way by mapping every ciphertext to an anytrust group in a deterministic fashion (e.g., using universal hashing). The servers then perform the following steps in parallel within their anytrust groups: 1) Broadcast the shares of the traps received from the users.
2) Ensure that these shares correspond to the user-submitted share commitments. 3) Reconstruct the trap from the shares, and check that the reconstructed trap is present in the set of traps outputted by the mixing network. 4) Report to the trustees if there were any violations in the previous steps. 5) Report to the trustees the number of dummy messages the group observed, if a routing network is used. 6) If the trustees release the inner decryption keys, then decrypt the inner ciphertexts. Trustees. Each trustee releases its share of the decryption key if and only if every server in every group reports no violation and the number of dummy messages is the expected number. Otherwise, each trustee deletes its share of the secret key.
When a malicious server removes or replaces a ciphertext, there is at least 50% chance that the modified ciphertext is a trap message because the users submit the ciphertexts in random order and the ciphertexts are indistinguishable. In other words, if the adversary tampers with a single message, there is a 50% chance that the adversary will tamper with a trap message, which would cause the entire protocol run to abort.
The adversary can then tamper with κ messages successfully with probability 2 −κ , the honest servers will abort if the adversary accidentally tampers with any trap messages. Since each removed or replaced ciphertext reduces the anonymity set of all users by one, the adversary can reduce the anonymity set size by at most κ with probability at most 2 −κ . The anonymity guarantee provided by the traps is therefore weaker than the guarantee that NIZKs provide.
In practical settings, the effects of attack may be minor. If, for example, there are over one million users in a Atom round, removing 80 users (which an adversary can do with probability at most 2 −80 ) leaves the honest users with a large anonymity set. It is important to note that this attack does not impact the privacy of the senders of the tampered ciphertexts: the inner ciphertexts are always encrypted under at least one honest server's public key, and thus the plaintext messages of the replaced messages are never revealed.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we address some of the practical issues that would arise in a real-world Atom deployment.
A. Ensuring maximal server utilization
To maximize the system's performance, it is important that the system take full advantage of the participating servers: each server's CPU should be fully utilized at all times.
A naïve implementation of Atom, that assigned each physical server to a single anytrust group, would not achieve this efficiency property. For example, consider an anytrust group with three physical servers. The third server in the group cannot do any mixing until the first and second servers have finished mixing, so the third server will spend the majority of its time waiting on the first servers, instead of doing useful work.
To ensure that every physical CPU core is being used at all times, we assign each physical server to many logical anytrust groups in Atom. By "staggering" the position of a server in different groups (e.g., Server s is the first server in the first group, second server in the second group, etc.), we try to ensure that every server is doing useful work at any given time.
B. Tolerating server churn
The failure of any server in a Atom deployment-even a benign failure-prevents the failed server's anytrust group from being able to make progress, which could cause the entire system to come to a halt. As the number of servers in the network increases, the chance that at least one server will fail during a round grows in proportion. To make Atom robust against fail-stop server failures, we could modify the system to use threshold anytrust groups ("many-trust groups"). If we are able to construct the many-trust groups in such a way that there are at least h honest servers in each group, then the system could tolerate the failure of up to h − 1 servers. Anytrust groups are just a special case of many-trust groups, with h = 1.
To modify Atom to use many-trust groups, we would replace each group keypair with a keypair for a threshold cryptosystem (e.g., threshold ElGamal). In a k-server group, we would share the keys in such a way that any k − h + 1 servers could decrypt messages encrypted for the group's key. Since there are at least h honest servers in each group, any subset of k − h + 1 servers must contain at least one honest server. A many-trust implementation of Atom would work much as the anytrust variant, except that only a subset of the group members would need to participate in the system in the common case. This also could impact the group creation strategy, described in §IV. For example, when h = 2, 20% of the servers are malicious, and λ = 80, we need k > 38 (compared to k > 34 when h = 1).
For threshold ElGamal encryption, the encryption and decryption is similar those of regular ElGamal, and the NIZK protocol described in §V-A can be used without any modifications. For trap variant of Atom, the users can use threshold secret sharing (e.g., Shamir secret sharing [61] ) for the traps instead of the additive secret-sharing scheme.
C. Ensuring large anonymity sets
An honest user of Atom is anonymous amongst all of the honest users of the system. For this to provide meaningful protection, though, there must be a large number of honest users participating in every run of the Atom system.
One way to ensure that every user is anonymous amongst a large set of honest users would be to construct a list of "registered users" of the system (i.e., a list of public keys) such that all users agree that the list contains a large number of honest users. The Atom servers could then wait to receive a ciphertext from every registered user before running the protocol in each time epoch.
In an open environment, in which users are often offline and in which new users frequently join the system, having a static list of registered users is untenable, and requiring every user to participate in every protocol run is unrealistic. Instead, the anytrust groups can take a more flexible approach: the entry anytrust groups can collect a number ciphertexts from enough users in each time epoch that is large enough to ensure that a "large number" of honest users have participated. The exact policy that the groups use would depend on the application, but it could be arbitrarily complicated. No matter what the policy is, the honest server in each anytrust group can enforce it. For example, each group could collect ciphertexts from 1,000 users on a list of "registered users" plus an additional 1,000 ciphertexts from un-registered users in each time epoch. As long as the policy ensures that the number of honest users participating in each run of the system is large, the honest users of the system have some assurance of privacy.
D. Denial-of-service attacks
While Atom protects the anonymity of all honest users, malicious users and servers can still try to attack the availability of the system. The NIZK variant of Atom is not vulnerable to user-instigated denial-of-service attacks, but malicious servers can still disrupt the system. Even so, when using the NIZK variant, honest servers can always identify misbehaving servers, and could potentially kick them out of the system. The faster trap-based variant of Atom ( §V-B) is vulnerable to anonymous in-protocol denial-of-service attacks by both users and servers. In the event of such an attack, the participants can use the NIZK-based Atom (potentially in parallel) for as long as the denial-of-service attack continues.
VII. EVALUATION
To evaluate Atom, we performed two classes of experiments on Amazon EC2. In the first set of experiments, we measured the performance of a single mixing iteration for the NIZK and trap variants of Atom. In the second, we perform end-to-end experiments using a large number of machines. In these latter experiments, we verify that the protocol and the prototype (1) scale horizontally, and (2) can handle a large number of messages. We carried out our experiments in the us-east-1 region of EC2, but we artificially added 40ms of latency (using the Linux utility tc) between each pair of servers to emulate a more realistic network environment. 4 The machines communicated over TLS channels. Implementation. We implemented an Atom prototype in Go in approximately 3,000 lines of code, using the Advanced Crypto Library [1]. For comparison purposes, we also implemented a cascade reencryption mix-net in Go using the same cryptography libraries. We use the NIST P-256 elliptic curve [6] for our cryptographic group and we use Neff's verifiable shuffle technique for the NIZK proof of shuffle correctness [53] . For our IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme, we use a variant of ElGamal augmented with a hash function [62] . The source code will be made available at github.com/kwonalbert/atom.
A. Microbenchmarks: anytrust group performance
To understand the performance of the building blocks of an Atom network, we measured the latency of one mixing iteration of an anytrust group. We used Amazon EC2's c4.large instances for majority of our experiments, which have two Intel Haswell Xeon E5-2666 vCPUs with 3.75 GB of memory. For these experiments, we fix the message size at 32 bytes.
NIZKs vs. traps. Atom supports two ways to protect against malicious servers ( §V): verifiable shuffles (NIZKs) and traps. To compare the performance of two techniques, we created a single anytrust group with five c4.large servers, and measured the time required to complete one mixing iteration. The number of messages varied from 128 and 16,384 messages, which is the expected range of message load per group in a large-scale Atom deployment. For example, if there are 1,024 groups and 2 20 messages, each group would handle 1,024 messages.
As shown in Figure 6 , the mixing time of both modes increases linearly with the number of messages, since the mixing time largely depends on the number of ciphertexts each server has to reblind and decrypt. Each mixing iteration takes roughly three times longer when using NIZKs than when using traps, due to the overhead of proof generation and verification. Based on these microbenchmarks, we estimate that a full Atom network using NIZKs would be three times slower than a trapbased Atom network.
Group size. The size of each anytrust group in Atom depends on the choice of security parameter and other trust decisions ( §IV-A). Figure 7 demonstrate the impact of group size on the mixing iteration time, when the group handles 1,024 messages. For the trap scheme, the mixing time increases linearly with group size, since each additional server just adds another serial set of reblind-and-decrypt operations to the mixing time. The NIZK-based scheme exhibits quadratic scaling with group size, since each of k servers must verify (k − 1) proofs. Number of CPU cores per server Number of cores. The computations that the Atom servers perform are all highly parallelizable especially for the trap variant: adding more cores to each server decreases the overall latency in proportion. To demonstrate this effect, we created an anytrust group of five servers using EC2 c4 nodes with 2, 4, 8, 16, and 36 cores. Figure 8 shows the mixing iteration time, for a few message batch sizes, as the number of cores per server varies. Latency decreases linearly with the number of cores for the trap-based Atom variant. The performance of the NIZK variant improves slightly as the number of CPU cores per server increases, but the NIZK proof generation and verification technique we use is inherently sequential, so the speedup is sub-linear in the number of cores.
B. Large-Scale Evaluation of Atom
In this set of experiments, we used up to 1,024 Amazon c4.large machines to test Atom's scalability and performance. We fixed the size of each anytrust group at five servers, and we used the trap variant of Atom. To quickly simulate a large number of users, we pre-computed the user ciphertexts and streamed them to each server at the start of the experiment. We used T = log 2 2 N mixing iterations when evaluating the butterfly network with N servers and T = 10 iterations when using the square network. For routing network, we used the branching factor β = √ N with T = 2 mixing iterations. Number of servers 
Number of server (horizontal scalability).
To demonstrate that Atom scales horizontally, we measured the end-to-end latency for the network to route 2 20 messages (approximately a million) as the number of servers increased. We used the trap variant of Atom for this experiment, and each message was 32 bytes. To capture the speed of the system shown in Figures 9 and 10 , we measure to the the time between the first server in the first mixing iteration receiving a message and the last server in the last mixing iteration outputting a message. Figure 9 compares the Atom variants to a baseline of a single cascade mix-net. This experiment demonstrates that even when the number of servers in the system is modest, Atom provides a scalability advantage over traditional anonymity systems. As the number of available servers increases, this scalability advantage of Atom grows linearly.
We also compare Atom against Vuvuzela [64] , using the source code at http://vuvuzela.io. As we describe in §IX, Vuvuzela is not an anonymous messaging system (it is a system for point-to-point messaging between mututally trusting users), but Vuvuzela still uses a cascade mix-net at its core. We compare against Vuvuzela to demonstrate that Atom, which provides a robust anonymity property, can even out-scale and outperform an optimized mix-net in certain settings.
The two horizontal lines in Figure 10 , show the latency to route a million messages with five c4.large servers in the group for each system (the same size as our Atom anytrust groups), with a cascade mix-net and withh Vuvuzela. We use the Vuvuzela system parameters proposed in the paper describing that system [64] (µ = 300, 000, b = 13, 800). As Figure 10 demonstrates, the latency of the network decreases with the number of servers: each group handles a smaller number of messages as we add more servers to the network. The butterfly topology, however, decreases at a slower rate than the other two networks because the number of mixing iterations required grows as log 2 N for N server groups. For example, as we increase from 2 9 servers to 2 10 servers, the load on each server decreases but the number of mixing iterations increases from 81 to 100. For the square topology, we see a linear decrease in the latency as the number of servers increases, as the number of mixing iterations required is independent of the number of participating servers. We also see that the square topology becomes faster than the routing network at 1,024 servers. This is due to the fact that we have fewer messages on each link (in expectation), and thus we require more dummy messages ( §III-B). The slower decrease in latency is also due to the required number of dummy messages.
The routing network performs better than cascade mix-net as soon as there are more than 64 servers. The butterfly network and the square network becomes faster than the cascade mix-net at 1,024 servers and 128 servers, respectively. When comparing to Vuvuzela, we see that the square and routing network start to outperform it at 128 servers. At 1,024 servers, the square and routing networks are more than 10× and 5× faster than cascade mix-net and Vuvuzela respectively.
Number of messages.
In addition to horizontal scalability, we measured Atom's ability to handle an increasing message load. We used 1,024 physical machines to create 1,024 five-server groups, with each server appearing in five different anytrust groups. We varied the number of messages from 2 17 to 2 21 , and each message was 32 bytes in length. We again used the trap variant of Atom for this evaluation.
As Figure 11 shows, the latency increases nearly linearly with the message load, for all Atom variants. This is because number of messages per group increases linearly with the total number of messages. To route one million messages, it takes the square network, the fastest network for that data point, 325 seconds, which is an order of magnitude faster than a classical cascade network and 2× faster than Vuvuzela. At two million messages, the routing network overtakes the square network as the fastest network. This is the opposite effect of what we saw in the horizontal scalability study: with fixed number of groups, more total messages implies more messages per connection. Thus, the network requires less padding. Message size. To understand the effect of message size on Atom, we varied the size of the message from 32 bytes (one elliptic curve point) to 160 bytes (five elliptic curve points), and routed one million messages through the network with 1,024 c4.large servers split into 1,024 five-server anytrust groups. Figure 12 shows that the latency scales linearly with the size of the message, and demonstrates that Atom can support over a million Tweets with less than 30 minutes of latency with 1,024 commodity machines. 5 
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We now discuss some aspects of Atom we did not consider in this paper and describe potential future work. Hybrid encryption. Both of the Atom variants we implement rely on using a highly structured rerandomizable encryption scheme based on ElGamal encryption. One of the limitations of such schemes is that they do not scale well with message length: doubling the length of the message doubles the time required to encrypt a message or rerandomize a ciphertext. In contrast, hybrid encryption schemes that make use of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives, have much better scaling properties: the computational cost to encrypt a 32-byte message is almost the same as the cost to encrypt a 32-kilobyte message.
An interesting challenge would be to devise a horizontally scalable anonymity system like Atom that uses a hybrid encryption scheme at its core, rather than the rerandomizable encryption scheme we use in Atom. Such a design would allow the system to handle much larger messages sizes than we can efficiently process in Atom and could open the door to application of Atom-like ideas to anonymous file-sharing or even web-browsing systems. Denial-of-service attacks. In designing Atom, our focus was on providing scalable anonymity in the face of a near-omnipresent adversary. We explicitly left DoS and other availability attacks out of scope for this work. That said, a practical deployment of Atom would have to defend against DoS attacks by malicious users and servers.
One promising way to defend against malicious servers would be to use the many-trust groups described in §VI. As long as there are enough servers remaining in the group, each group can simply remove the malicious server and form a different threshold group to continue the protocol. Defending against malicious users in the more efficient trapbased Atom variant ( §V-B) would be more challenging. In principle, users could prove in zero knowledge that their pair of submitted ciphertexts is well-formed, but making this proof practically efficient would be challenging. We leave the task of implementing and optimizing more robust Atom to future work. Two-way private communication. Atom provides a senderanonymous messaging primitive: users send messages through the system and each message ends up at one of the system's servers (such that no one knows who sent which message). For an anonymous Twitter or anonymous whistleblowing application, having one-directional broadcast communication is sufficient.
We can also use Atom as a primitive on which we build a bidirectional communications infrastructure, as in prior work [7] , [43] , [59] , [64] . Once two users, A and B, who wish to communicate privately have established a shared secret key k AB , they can use this secret key to derive a sequence of pseudorandom "mailbox" indices (i 1 , i 2 , . . . ). If user A wants to send a message to user B, she encrypts her message to user B and then sends a tuple i t , Enc(pk B , m) through Atom, where i is the pseudorandom mailbox index for the current time epoch t, and Enc(pk B , m) is A's ciphertext encrypted to B. The Atom servers can sort the tuples by the mailbox index and B can download all messages at index i t in time period t to receive his mail. The servers will know that some user is communicating with B, but they will not know which user it is. By adding noise messages (like Vuvuzela [64] ), or using private-information retrieval [18] , we can further prevent servers from learning if anyone is communicating with B.
An anonymous user X can establish a shared secret with any user B using a similar idea. User B can establish a well-known public mailbox identifier i B . To initiate a conversation with user B (or "dial user B," in the termniology of Vuvuzela [64] ), the anonymous user X sends the tuple i B , Enc(pk B , k XB ) through the Atom network. After fetching this tuple and decrypting the ciphertext, B will have established a shared secret k XB with user X (though B has no idea who X is). Users B and X can communicate using this shared secret, as described in the previous paragraph. Intersection attacks. Users in Atom can join and leave the network at any time. This property immediately makes Atom vulnerable to intersection attacks [25] , [40] by a global network adversary. To mount the attack, the adversary observes the set of participating users and the set of outputs of the system (e.g., messages about a protest in Turkey). If a particular user is always online when someone is sending messages about protests in Turkey, then the adversary might conclude that this particular user is the one sending those messages.
Every anonymity system that allows the set of users to change over time is vulnerable to this attack when the adversary can observe the entire network. Atom does not protect against this attack, but known techniques [69] can mitigate its effectiveness.
IX. RELATED WORK
Tor [26] is the only anonymous communication system in widespread use today. Like Atom, Tor scales horizontally. Unlike Atom, Tor aims to support low-latency real-time traffic streams and Tor does not aim to defend against a global network adversary. Recent analysis of the Tor network suggests that even certain local adversaries may be able to deanonymize Tor users [14] , [36] , [54] , [66] .
Aqua [45] , Crowds [58] , and most free-route mixnets [24] , [51] also scale horizontally. As with Tor, these systems do not provide any guaranteed anonymity properties in the face of powerful near-global adversaries. In the worst case, the anonymity properties of these systems can degenerate to the set of users who share the same entry point to the network, which may be just a small set of users.
The parallel mixing protocol of Golle and Juels [31] uses a distributed network of mix servers, similar to Atom. Golle and Juels, however, consider only passively adversarial servers and their system has latency that scales up linearly with the number of malicious mix servers. In contrast, Atom handles malicious mix servers and exhibits latency that grows polylogarithmically (asymptotically) with the number of malicious mix servers.
Chaum's cascade mix-nets [17] and Dining Cryptographer networks (DC-Nets) [15] are the earliest examples of anonymity systems that provide provable protection against global adversaries. However, neither of these systems scales horizontally: mix-nets incur overhead linear in the number of servers, and DC-Nets incur overhead quadratic in the number of participants. Systems-such as Herbivore [30] , Dissent [68] , and Riffle [43] -that build on these primitives, face similar problems when trying to scale. Riposte [19] is an anonymity system that uses techniques from private information retrieval [18] to scale to support millions of users in microblogging scenarios. Riposte requires each server to perform work linear in the number of messages being sent through the system, which implies that the total work at each server is quadratic in the number of users (if every user transmits a message). In contrast, each server in Atom does work near-linear in the number of messages.
Vuvuzela [64] is a recent system that provides point-topoint metadata-hiding communication (not anonymity). Using Vuvuzela, two users who share a secret can communicate via the system without a global eavesdropper learning that these two users are communicating. Vuvuzela is not useful for anonymous whistleblowing, since the recipient of a message always knows its sender. Furthermore, the system does not scale horizontally: increasing the throughput of the system requires increasing the size of each server. Pung [7] addresses the same problem as Vuvuzela, but does so without the need for an anytrust assumption. Pung instead relies on computational private information retrieval, which escapes the need for trust assumptions but comes at significant computational costs [42] . Similar to Vuvuzela, Pung does not provide anonymity.
The security analysis of Atom draws on the theoretical analysis of permutation networks. Permutation networks have long been studied as a way to permute a large number of elements using a network built of small components ("switches") [65] . In a 1993 paper, Rackoff and Simon [57] proposed building a distributed mix-net from a large permutation network. Their paper demonstrated that in theory, it would be possible to construct a distributed mix-net, though their paper did not give much insight into whether such a construction could ever be practical (e.g., their scheme apparently required log k n iterations of mixing to mix n messages, where k was a "doubledigit" number [22] ). In Atom, we convert this theoretical result into a practical one: with a number of optimizations and an implementation, we show that distributed mixing can be faster than classical cascade mixing. Abe also proposed building a distributed mix-net from a butterfly permutation network [4] , though the construction had a flawed security analysis [5] .
Recent theoretical work has investigated the number of iterations of a butterfly network required to so that a random setting of the switches produces a random permutation with good probability [47] - [49] . Czumaj and Vöcking [20] , [23] have recently argued that O(log 2 (M)) iterations are enough to generate an "almost" random permutation of M inputs, in a particular sense. Håstad studied a permutation network [35] based on shuffling the rows and columns of a square matrix. Czumaj et al. [22] studied randomly constructed permutation networks and demonstrated that most networks of depth O(log 2 (M)) and width O(M) produce good random permutations.
X. CONCLUSION Atom is a anonymous communication system that marries the horizontal scalability properties of Tor with the trafficanalysis-resistance properties of classical mix-nets and DCnets. To do so, Atom draws on a diverse set of design ideas from prior work. To build the core distributed mixing network, Atom uses permutation networks and routing networks. To defend against malicious servers, Atom divides servers into anytrust groups. To protect anonymity in the face of active attacks, Atom uses zero-knowledge proof techniques and "trap" messages. An extensive evaluation of our Atom prototype on a distributed system consisting of over one thousand servers demonstrates that the system scales well as the number of participating servers increases. Additionally, we show that Atom can support millions of users in a latency-tolerant microblogging scenarios. With its distributed and scalable design, Atom takes traffic-analysis-resistant anonymity closer to real-world practicality.
